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Objective: To experimentally test the hypothesis that people who repeatedly participate
in forms of non-violent crime exhibit an executive deficit detected in tests of high ecological
validity, having changes in prefrontal functioning as neurophysiologic basis. 
Participants and Methods: A battery to assess executive dysfunction was administered – the
Behavioural Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome (BADS) –to an experimental group
of 30 inmates convicted of crimes against property (mean age = 39.3, SD =9.98), and a
control group of 30 (mean age = 32.7, SD = 11.8), all male.  
Results: The group of recurrent inmates performed significantly worse than the control
group in their global scores on the battery, as well as in the majority of subscales.
Conclusion: Without removing from consideration the fact that sample size was not very
large and, primarily, alerting ourselves to the dangerous hypothesis of a “frontal
criminogenesis,” the authors interpret criminal recurrence and resistance to penal measures
in terms of the scarcity of control that individuals from the experimental group have over
their behavior and its respective consequences. 
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Objetivo: Verificar experimentalmente la hipótesis de que las personas que participan
repetidamente en delitos no violentos exhiben un déficit ejecutivo en pruebas de alta
validez ecológica, y cambios en su funcionamiento prefrontal como substrato neurofisiológico. 
Participantes y Métodos: Se administró una batería para evaluar la disfunción ejecutiva
– el Behavioural Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome (BADS) –a un grupo
experimental de 30 presos condenados por crímenes contra la propiedad (edad = 39,3,
DT = 9,98) y a un grupo control de 30 personas (edad = 32.7, DT =11.8), todos varones.  
Resultados: el grupo de presos reincidentes obtuvieron puntuaciones significativamente
peores que las del grupo control en la batería, así como en la mayoría de las subescalas.
Conclusión: sin dejar de considerar el hecho de que ninguna de las muestras era de
tamaño muy grande y, especialmente alertando acerca de la hipótesis peligrosa de una
“criminogénesis frontal”, los autores interpretan le reincidencia criminal y la resistencia
a las normas del código penal en términos de la falta de control que los individuos del
grupo experimental tienen sobre su comportamiento y sus consecuencias respectivas.
Palabras clave: reincidencia criminal, comportamiento criminal, neuropsicología, disfunción
ejecutiva
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Neuropsychological research about crime has focused
on the search for evidence of neurological dysfunction that
could contribute to understanding antisocial behavior in
general, and of criminal behavior in particular, especially
when that conduct is recurrent. 
The majority of researchers that conduct neuropsychological
studies of transgressors have primarily concentrated on the
anterior regions of the brain, more specifically, areas of the
prefrontal lobe. These areas are directly involved in the
highest mental functions such as selective attention, working
memory, action-planning competency, forethought, self-control
and, at the most basic level, the regulation of the affective-
emotional life. Thus, the study of these functions has
enormous relevance to understanding not only the behavioral
changes associated with various pathologies, but also,
although for different reasons, the conduct that deviates from
social norms.  
If we had to summarize the results of frontal lobe
neuropsychological research, we would say that considered
on the whole, studies suggest that there is neuropsychological
dysfunction associated with crime in general, even if
evidence of prefrontal dysfunction shows greater consistency
among inmates incarcerated for violent crimes (Barbosa,
2001).
In other words, the results of neuropsychological and
psychophysiological studies (Marques-Teixeira, 2000;
Barbosa, 2001) tend to demonstrate that prefrontal
dysfunction is characteristic of antisocial behavior in general
– a marker for persistent, criminal behavior. This would
explain the cases in which no significant psychobiological
differences emerge between inmates who are psychopaths
and those who are not, or between violent criminals and
those convicted of non-violent crimes but have had
prolonged antisocial careers. In effect, and according to
Selby et al. (1998), the inmates’ results indicate significant
neurocognitive dysfunction in more than 60% of the
measures used. 
From the case of Phineas Gage (Harlow, 1868), to
contemporary studies of the prefrontal cortex, a group of
deficits has been revealed, today known as Frontal Lobe
Syndrome (MacKinnon & Yudofsky, 1986; Silver &
Yudofsky, 1987). It is characterized by a reduction in social
aptitude, argumentative capability, symbolic understanding,
forethought and worries about the behavioral consequences,
as well as the loss of emotional resonance and increased
impulsivity, distraction, emotional instability, among other
changes. 
Recently, abnormalities have been observed in decision-
making, more markedly in the social sphere, in people with
psychopathology incurred by orbitofrontal (Meyers et al.,
1992) and ventromedial (Damásio, 1994; Saver & Damásio,
1991) lesions. As Damásio (1994) described, these patients
lose the capacity to generate a series of appropriate,
alternative behaviors to respond to social situations and to
anticipate the potential consequences of those alternatives,
although there is no clear deficit in “pure” reasoning. In
reality, evidence that orbitofrontal lesions do not produce a
concrete deficit in reasoning seems to mistakenly imply that
those lesions or dysfunctions do not exist (at least as
identifiable using traditional evaluative instruments) in a
considerable part of the recurrent criminal population—for
example, in many of the inmates who are psychopaths (Hare
et al., 1980). 
Precisely for the above reason, and for its impact on the
criminal subject’s responsibility for his or her own actions,
it is important to explore the hypothesis that there are
prefrontal dysfunctions among recurrent criminals whose
delinquent spree is marked by a precocious beginning and
by the frequent practice of criminal acts (i.e., in which
antisocial behavior is more pronounced). If they exist, these
dysfunctions would restrict the available degrees of freedom
to behave alternatively to crime, given that the prefrontal
cortex determines the executive functions of the brain. 
The term “executive functions” describes a group of
mental capacities that allow an individual to define
objectives, anticipate potential consequences, design plans
of action, initiate mental and behavioral operations from
motivation, control one’s own actions, exhibit cognitive
flexibility and organize behavior over time and space (Groth-
Marnat, 2000; Pineda, 1996; Pineda, Cadavid & Mancheno,
1996; Stuss & Benson, 1986; Weyandt & Willis, 1994).
To evaluate executive functioning is a particularly
problematic task due to the lack of methodological consensus,
and the short supply of specific instruments. Also, the devices
for neuropsychological evaluation that have been used for
this purpose are of an excessively artificial and structured
nature. They do not conveniently reflect the demands of real
life where the dysfunctions are felt.  
Recently, new instruments have emerged that combine a
solid theoretical foundation with adequate psychometric and
ecological validity. The Behavioural Assessment of the
Dysexecutive Syndrome (BADS) is one of the instruments
that systematically uses everyday tasks as a way of evaluating
the executive functions (Wilson, Alderman, Burgess, Emslie,
& Evans, 1996). The battery was developed in response to
the need for neuropsychological instruments that are more
sensitive, valid and reliable in this area, at the same time
overcoming the deficiencies associated with conventional
tests. In spite of its relatively recent development, according
to various researchers (e.g., Wilson et al., 1998; Crawford,
1998; Crawford et al., 2000; Groth-Marnat, 2000; Norris &
Tate, 2000), this battery shows a promising potential for
responding to the aforementioned needs. 
At the same time, this battery is particularly efficient at
detecting subtle difficulties with the planning and organization
of actions, especially in cases of people for whom cognitive
capacity seems to be preserved for well-structured situations
(Spreen & Strauss, 1998), as seems to be the case for certain
previously-mentioned groups of inmates, which might not
have been detected by conventional tests. 
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By using the BADS to neuropsychologically evaluate
inmates, we tried to advance beyond the number of relatively
disorganized studies that have suggested that there is a
prefrontal deficit in this population. We pointed to the global
evaluation of executive functioning in a subgroup of this
population – recurrent criminals – because the effects of
those functions are subtler. This new instrument allowed us
to predict the impact of dysfunctions that will eventually
be detected in the activities of everyday life. 
This confirmed the hypothesis that recurrent inmates
(who have been labeled as having antisocial tendencies) are
characterized by executive deficits, evidenced by instruments
that have high ecological validity. The confirmation of that
hypothesis could contribute to explaining the difficulty within
this group when it comes to planning, organizing, and
regulating one’s behavior to choose alternatives to crime. 
Method
Participants
Two groups of 30 participants were evaluated, all male.
One was the control group (CG), and the other the
experimental group (EG). 
The EG was composed of recurrent inmates convicted
of non-violent crimes (primarily crimes against property),
between the ages of 23 and 70 (M = 39.3, SD = 9.98) from
two different prison facilities in the northern region of
Portugal. They all had at least two prior convictions (M =
3.0) that required jail-time. 
The article 75 of the Portuguese Penal Code defines
recurrence as having committed a crime punishable by
serving at least 6 months in prison, after having been
previously convicted of a similar crime with a minimum
sentence of 6 months, with no more than five years between
the two convictions (excluding the duration of the sentence
itself). Nevertheless, for the purpose of composing the
experimental sample, those judicial-penal criteria were altered:
inmates were considered eligible to participate in the study
if they had committed two or, preferably, more voluntary
crimes, punishable with a prison sentence. Any duration of
prison sentence qualified, regardless of whether or not that
sentence was fully, and effectively served, or whether there
were alternative means of punishment applied. That change
was justified by the fact that the scientific qualifications are
not subject to judicial criteria. In fact, the previously-described
antisocial tendency does not necessarily depend upon the
kind of punishment applied or upon any temporal criteria,
which are dogmatic and therefore difficult to support in
science. 
As for the CG, that group was composed of 30 men
between the ages of 19 and 67 (M = 32.7, SD = 11.8) from
neighborhoods of the Oporto region and/or recruited from
the Initial Professional Training Centers of the National
Institute for Employment and Professional Training. This
group was selected to ensure the best possible matching of
the samples in terms of academic qualifications (obligatory
level of education or less), and socioeconomic background
(lower or lower-middle class). 
In both groups, cases of physical or sensory handicap,
brain lesions, psychopathology, drug addiction and mental
retardation were controlled (eliminated). The control condition
was ensured by conducting a semi-structured, diagnostic
interview with each CG participant, in which the Mini-Mental
State Examination was also administered. Participants’
information was checked according to information provided
by the technical staff, and through authorized examination
of individual records (only, of course, in the case of the
inmates). 
All participants were informed of the nature and objectives
of the study, and participation in all neuropsychological tests
was voluntary. 
Materials
In order to evaluate executive dysfunction, the
Behavioural Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome
(BADS) was used, which is a neuropsychological battery
of essentially manipulative tests developed by Wilson and
his collaborators (Wilson et al., 1996).
The BADS is divided into six subtests with tasks that
emulate real-life activities, conceived in order to diagnose
the existence of a deficit in general executive functioning,
or in specific types of executive functioning.  It is especially
sensitive to the capacities affected by problem-solving skills,
as well as planning and intentional organization of behavior
over prolonged periods of time. More specifically, the
subtests in the battery allowed us to assess: correct response
to a rule of conduct and adaptation as a function of
changing environmental contingencies; planning one’s actions
in order to problem resolution; anticipating the consequences,
organizing one’s actions across time and space aiming at
specific goals; emotional, behavioral and cognitive changes,
or changes in motivation, which are associated with frontal
dysfunction. 
To avoid potential cognitive deficits, we applied the
Mini-Mental State Examination (Folstein, Folstein, &
McHugh, 1975). 
Procedure
After obtaining informed consent, semi-structured,
diagnostic interviews were employed, always one-on-one,
in which data was collected to characterize the participants
and the Mini-Mental State Examination was administered. 
The BADS was administered during a second one-on-
one session to all subjects of the EG and the CG, and always
by the same psychologist (specially trained). That session,
dedicated exclusively to administering the BADS, was
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carried out just a few days later for the control group. The
duration of data collection sessions varied from forty minutes
to one hour, depending on individual performance. 
In administering the battery, all directives described in
the BADS manual were rigorously obeyed and the subscales
were applied in the following order. 
1. Rule Shift Cards: evaluated the ability to change an
established response pattern using familiar materials.
In the first part, a response pattern is established
according to a simple rule. In the second part, the
rule is altered and participants have to adapt their
behavioral responses, inhibiting the original response
pattern. 
2. Action Program: this is designed to test the ability
to solve practical problems. There is an object that
must be moved from one place to another, but the
resolution of that problem can only be achieved
through the conveniently-planned use of various other
materials, which were equally distributed to
participants. 
3. Key Search: is designed to test strategies of action.
Analogous to whatever common problem, subjects
are invited to demonstrate how they would find a lost
object in a field, and their strategy of action is
evaluated according to its adjusment and the
probability that it would succeed.
4. Temporal Judgment: this test includes four questions
that evaluate one’s capacity to foresee or estimate
how much time, on average, it takes to fulfill various
tasks, events, or day-to-day activities. 
5. Zoo Map: is a test of action planning. It gives
information about the ability to plan a trip to visit six
of twelve possible sites within a zoo. Subjects must
first do this in an open situation, with an undetermined
purpose; little external structure to behavior is
provided. Then, they have to plan it in a situation that
involves simply following a concrete behavioral
strategy, externally imposed. 
6. Modified Six Elements: this is a test of planning,
temporal organization of tasks and self-assessment of
success. It is a simplified version of the original test
by Shallice and Burgess (1991) in which subjects had
to organize six tasks and plan their time to execute
them all in ten minutes. 
After proceeding through the sequence of subscales, a
score was calculated for each (0-minimum to 4-maximum)
in accordance with evaluation criteria provided in the manual
(cf. Wilson et al., 1996), and the global score on the battery
was derived from the sum of the partial scores (0-minimum
to 24-maximum). Considering that this experimental study
was comparative (between-group), the conversion of
individual scores into standard scores was avoided; instead,
we worked directly with “profile” results. Apart from the
statistical measures of central tendency and distribution,
(means and standard deviations), we proceeded to apply
parametric statistics (t-test) in order to estimate between-
groups differences. Although normality and homogeneity
were not confirmed by the distribution of the majority of
the results, the parametric tests were considered to be
sufficiently robust to perform an adequate statistical analysis,
according to Lindman’s (1974) arguments. 
For the statistical treatment of our data, we used Statistica
software (version 6) by Statsoft. 
Results
The presentation of the results will begin with partial
scores collected for each subscale, and will conclude with
the global results.
Partial Scores 
The means and standard deviation of the results were
calculated for each subscale and for each group, estimating
the statistical significance of the differences using a t-test.
The results obtained are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1
Means, Standard Deviations, t Values and Effect Size (Cohen’s d) of the Partial Results of the Control and Experimental
Groups in each of the 6 BADS Subtests 
Control Group Experimental Group
M SD M SD       t value d
Rule Shift 3.30 0.88 2.27 1.48 3.28** 0.85
Action Program 3.67 0.80 3.43 0.77 1.15 —
Key Search 2.57 1.04 1.07 0.74 6.44** 1.66
Temporal Judgement 1.67 0.80 1.23 0.77 2.13* 0.55
Zoo Map 3.20 0.81 1.97 0.96 5.38** 1.39
Modified Six Elements 3.83 0.46 3.10 0.92 3.89** 1.00
Note. Statistical power is always > .80 for α = .05, except in the Temporal Judgement Test, when it has a value of .44
*p < .05. ** p < .01.
BADS Subscales
RECURRENT CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR AND EXECUTIVE DYSFUNCTION              263
As may be observed by an analysis of the table, the
group of recurrent inmates was less successful than the
control group in all subscales of the battery without
exception. The differences in performance were revealed to
be statistically significant in all subtests except for the second
– action program. 
As for the time it took to execute each section, for the
subtests in which time was taken into account (1, 2, 3, and
5), we obtained the results presented in Table 2. 
In this way, it was verified that the group of inmates
needed significantly longer periods of time compared to the
control group to execute the tasks of all the subscales where
time was taken into consideration as a factor in their
performance.  
Global Results
The mean values, standard deviation and standard error
were once again calculated for the global results of each
group, and for the global time it took to perform each of
the timed tests. 
In the analysis of Figures 1 and 2, it was observed that
the global result obtained for the group of inmates (M =13.17,
SD = 3.24) was clearly lower than that of the control group
(M = 18.30, SD = 2.76), the difference being highly
significant (t(58) = 6.61, p < .01, Cohen’s d = 1.71). Also,
the time it took to complete the subscales differs with equal
statistical significance (t(58) = –5.31, p < .01, Cohen’s d =
1.37), in favor of the control group (M = 339.80, SD = 117.22
vs. M = 583.13,  SD = 221.95 in the EG). In both cases the
statistical power observed is 1.00 for α = .05. 
Discussion 
This study joins the scarce biopsychological research
that has recurrent criminality as its primary object of study.
Also, it is distinctive in that it studied perpetrators of minor
crimes, for which it is more complex and controversial to
confirm neuropsychological dysfunction. 
Furthermore, it is unique in that it used a device with high
ecological validity and that was specially designed to evaluate
Table 2
Means, Standard Deviations, t Values  and Effect Size (Cohen’s d) of the Time needed to Perform each BADS Subtest in
the Control and Experimental Groups
Control Group (n = 30)          Experimental Group (n = 30)
M SD M SD       t value d
Rule Shift 29.77 8.14 49.33 17.46 –5.56** 1.44
Action Program 71.40 43.67 115.63 69.13 –2.96** 0.77
Key Search 49.90 24.25 85.40 53.60 –3.30** 0.85
Zoo Map 188.73 87.16 332.77 146.85 –4.62** 11.9
Note. statistical power is always > .08, α = .05.
** p < .01.
Timed BADS subscales (seconds)
Figure 1. Means and standard error of the Control and Experimental
groups’ results.
Figure 2. Means and standard error of the total time needed (in
seconds) by the Control and Experimental groups to perform subscales.
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executive dysfunction— the BADS—which was chosen for
three primary reasons. First, it has virtually no verbal content,
so it is not compromised by cultural bias and is easily
transferable to research in other cultures. Second, studies of
validity conducted in clinical groups (psychopathology and
prefrontal lesioning) demonstrated that performance on the
battery is strongly correlated with the evaluations filled out
by subjects’ relatives, confirming that the results of the BADS
are sensitive to executive deficit and are good indicators of
the daily problems encountered by people with prefrontal
lesion or dysfunction (Wilson et al., 1996). Last, an
independent study about the ecological, construct, and
concurrent validities of the BADS compared to other
conventional tests of executive functioning has demonstrated
that the results of that battery are significantly correlated with
the results of conventional tests and are comparable to those
tests as far as distinguishing individuals with and without
cerebral lesions (Norris & Tate, 2000). In reality, the BADS
has demonstrated a superior ecological validity, proving it
has a better ability to predict the competencies that are
necessary to function in a real context (Norris & Tate, 2000).  
Overall, the results obtained through the BADS in the
present study reveal that the recurrent criminals who were
studied suffer from executive dysfunction, by comparing
them to a sample of individuals whose conduct remains
within socially acceptable patterns.
A closer analysis allows us to conclude that the
performance of the experimental group was significantly
deficient in all subtests, except for action program. However,
the time taken to complete that subtest for the criminals,
similar to what occurred in the other subtests, was
significantly higher than in the control group, and they
obtained worse results. Their weak performance in various
subtests suggests the increased difficulty that recidivist
criminals have with learning rules of behavior and, more
importantly, in the substitution of those rules with others
when the first prove inefficient. Those same difficulties are
felt in the effective planning of a course of action, as well
as in monitoring and regulating one’s own behavior. This
low performance also shows that these individuals have less
of an ability to utilize external references to orient their
behavior. In truth, not only do they tend to fail to carry out
concrete, behavioral strategies in highly structured situations—
in which they ought to respect externally imposed norms—
they fail most of all when they have to spontaneously plan
their behavior in minimally structured contexts. 
In light of this set of results, can we affirm that executive
dysfunction lies within the etiology of chronic forms of
transgressive behavior? Is that data enough to assert the
existence of frontal lobe “criminogenesis?” 
Obviously, frontal “criminogenesis” should only be
alleged with the utmost caution, given that criminal behavior
is, by nature, heterogeneous and that it is determined by an
array of factors. It is easy to accept the notion that the
neuropsychological factors involved in crimes against
property differ from those involved in violent crime. Along
those lines, neuropsychological correlates may differ in
recurrent criminality and primary criminality, or in antisocial
behaviors that are not actually criminal.  We concur with
Marques-Teixeira (2000) in his suggestion that the
designation antisocial should be reserved for individuals
with a stable tendency toward behaviors that are contrary
to the social order. Those behaviors constitute criminal
actions when, as well as being socially reprehensible, they
violate judicial-penal rules. If, here, we use the notion of
antisocial and its varieties indiscriminately, we do so because
it is more important in this case to emphasize the recurrence
of those acts, than to delineate the differences between them,
or between the people who carry them out.  
The direction of causality between neurobiological factors
and criminal behavior is another issue. The majority of
studies have been developed under the general belief that
neurobiological conditions precede crime and not the inverse,
which is clearly disputable. Many authors argue that the risk
associated with a life of crime may be responsible for a
greater incidence of cerebral lesions among the criminal
population, particularly at the frontal area, given the higher
susceptibility of this region of the brain (for reference, see
Barbosa, 2000).
It would be impossible to confirm that an executive
deficit found in recurrently transgressive individuals is the
primary cause of criminal recurrence, or that adopting high-
risk behaviors brought on lesions of the neuroanatomical
substrate. However, the empirical data and research
methodology employed (excluding subjects whose clinical
records indicated or caused us to suspect of lesions or
neuropathology, and excluding participants with bellow-
normative mental and cognitive aptitudes), allows us to
insist that the executive deficit found does play a role at a
functional level. 
In any case, be it of a functional or structural etiology,
or both, this behavioral phenomenon shares many common
denominators with the Dysexecutive Syndrome (DS). The
term Dysexecutive Syndrome (Baddeley, 1986), refers to a
similar clinical-frame to what was previously described as
Prefrontal Lobe Syndrome, characterized by disorder in the
planning and organizing of actions, problem-solving, and
selective attention. In cases of pathology, lesioning or
cerebral dysfunction, the DS is considered one of the
principle areas of neurocognitive deficit that impedes the
full functional recuperation and the possibility of recovering
a socially responsible, independent, well-adapted, and well-
spent life. The people affected by this syndrome tend to
show high levels of impulsivity, distraction, difficulty using
environmental feedback to regulate their behavior, and they
tend to behave in a way that is poorly adjusted to social
situations. 
For those reasons, executive dysfunction also poses
certain limitations to how people respond to rehabilitation
and resocialization programs (Wilson et al., 1996). Being
certain of the statistical association between recurrent,
delinquent behavior and executive deficit, according to
Wilson and his collaborators (1996), that deficit could
contribute to explaining the increased resistance of these
individuals to resocialization programs. Consequently,
alterations in prefrontal functioning should not be excluded
from biopsychological advances where, articulated by other
factors, they favor conceptual developmental models that
are more integrated and, thus, more able to explain the
perseverance of certain individuals in criminal patterns. In
other words, without meaning to exclude other psychological
and social factors, it is plausible that, among other effects
of executive deficit, the scarcity of mental control exhibited
by this group of people over their behavior, their reduced
flexibility and self-control, and their difficulty to conceive
behavioral consequences, may result in maladjusted
behaviors, some of which are contrary to the law. 
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